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The board of directors has the authority to decide on the sale of the company’s own stocks,
and the board of directors’ decision to duly dispose of the company’s own stocks that have been
legitimately acquired should, in principle, be deemed lawful. Even when the company sells its
own shares for the defense of the management right, the legality of such sale should be determined
considering the reasonable basis and proportionality of the defensive action. If the decision to sell
the company’s own shares to its shareholders or to third parties is subject to the business
judgment of the board of directors, the legality of such sale should be determined in accordance
with the same principle. The board of directors’ decision to sell the company shares should thus be
determined in accordance with the principle of reasonable basis and the principle of
proportionality. However, if the purpose of the sale of the company shares is only for the benefit of
the controlling shareholder having the management right, rather than for the benefit of the
company and the shareholders as a whole, then it may be possible for such sale to be deemed
illegal. The sale of the company’s own shares per se should not be considered an automatic
violation of the principle of shareholder equality. Nevertheless, if the company’s own shares are
sold to certain major shareholders at a price that this significantly lower than the market price,
such sale may be in violation of the principle of shareholder equality or the directors’ duty of care
as the fiduciary of the shareholders.
I. Introduction: Defending against Hostile Takeovers
The term “mergers and acquisitions” (M&A) is generally understood as
referring to a transaction that aims for control of management.1) Among
different types of M&As, a hostile takeover presupposes an adverse
relationship between the current board of directors of the target company and
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the hostile company trying to acquire the target company. 
In the event of a hostile takeover attempt, the management of the target
company can use defense strategies involving the acquisition of company
shares or the amendment of articles of incorporation. Examples of defense
strategies involving the purchase of the target company’s shares include: (i)
acquisition of shares for control; (ii) securing of a friendly shareholder for
mutual cooperation; (iii) repurchase and sale of the company’s own shares;
(iv) paid-in capital increase through a designated third party; (v) issuance of
convertible securities to friendly parties; (vi) issuance of bonds with warrant to
friendly parties; (vii) use of a white knight; and (viii) large-scale paid-in capital
increase. Defense strategies involving the amendment of articles of
incorporation include: (i) amendment of provision relating to issuance of new
shares to a third party; (ii) adoption of staggered board system; (iii) tightening
of director qualifications; (iv) tightening of requirements for appointment of
director; (v) adoption of a special majority rule; (vi) inclusion of a golden
parachute; (vii) limitation on use of proxy votes; and (viii) exclusion of
cumulative voting system. In addition to these two types of defense measures,
the target company may use strategies involving operational management,
other specific defense activities (e.g., sale of material assets and report or
alerting to the regulatory authorities of the aggressor company’s violation of
disclosure duties, procedural regulations or any other such laws or
regulations), and the prescription of poison pills.2)
A hostile takeover can have both positive and negative effects. On the
positive side, a hostile takeover can reduce the agency problem, enhance
efficiency in management, and increase social and economic wealth. On the
negative side, a hostile takeover can transfer wealth from, or reduce the
wealth of, shareholders and bring a myopic attitude to operational planning.3)
Accordingly, whether or not a hostile takeover is justifiable depends on
whether it produces more positive results than negative ones. 
The target company’s stock repurchase4) and the sale of the target
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company’s own stocks to a third party have generally been accepted as legally
permissible ways of defending against hostile takeover attempts. However,
the legality of these defense strategies came into question with a preliminary
disposition and the subsequent final holding on a case before the Seoul
Western District Court in 2006, involving a hostile takeover situation. In that
case, the Court held that the target company’s over-the-counter sale of stocks
to the controlling shareholder, serving as the representative director of the
company, and other persons in special relationship with the controlling
shareholder were illegal because such sale violated other shareholders’ rights
under the principle of shareholder equality. In light of this new development,
the following sections examine legal issue relating to defense strategies against
hostile takeover attempts, including issues involving the sale of the target
company’s treasury shares.
II. Defense Strategies against Hostile Takeovers and Duties
of Director
1. Legal Principles on Director’s Duties
Under the Anglo-American legal system, a director of a company must act
in compliance with the principles of duty of care and duty of loyalty. Under
the principle of duty of care, the director must exercise the care that a
reasonable person would use under similar circumstances, and the director
may be held responsible for her action or inaction during the performance of
her duties.
The duty of loyalty, on the other hand, requires the director to act in the
best interest of the company,5) and in the event of a conflict between the
interest of the director and the interest of the company, the director must put
the company’s interest ahead of her own. To determine whether a director has
breached her duty of care, the Court applies the doctrine of business
judgment, and for determination on the director’s violation of duty of loyalty,
the principle of fair dealing is applied. 
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The Commercial Act of Korea characterizes the relationship between the
company and its director as an agency relationship requiring the director to
perform her duty as a fiduciary of the Company (Commercial Code, Art.
382(2); Civil Act, Art. 681) and in accordance with laws and regulations and
the company’s articles of incorporation (Commercial Act, Art. 382-3).
Accordingly, if the director violates her duty as a fiduciary or the duty of
loyalty, and the company suffers damages as a result, then the director may be
held liable for the damages (Commercial Act, Art. 399(1)). Moreover, in the
event the company incurs an irreparable damage as a result of directors’
action in violation of law, regulations or the articles of incorporation, the
shareholders may bring a derivative action against the directors (Commercial
Act, Art. 402). One peculiar aspect of the Korean law that is that a director
may be criminally charged with malfeasance under the Act on the Aggravated
Punishment, Etc. of Specific Economic Crimes.
2. Duties of Director and Defense against Hostile Takeovers
No consensus has been reached in legal communities over whether
directors of the target company may actively intervene to defend their
management control against a hostile takeover attempt.6) Under the American
legal system and Korea’s majority view, directors are, in principle, permitted
to defend their management, using their business judgment, and directors are
held responsible for any abuse of their power committed in their defense
efforts.7) To qualify as a legitimate business judgment in the Korean legal
system, the following elements must be shown: (i) directors’ judgment on a
business matter; (ii) disinterestedness and independence of directors; (iii) a
judgment based on sufficient information; (iv) good will; (v) absence of abuse
of discretion; (vi) absence of fraud, illegality, abuse of authority, and waste of
company assets.8) Directors must also consider all reasonably accessible
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material information before making any business judgment in relation to the
sale of the company. Particularly, before deciding on a matter relating to an
M&A transaction, directors have the duty of care as fiduciary of the company
to collece all necessary information and to act with caution.9) Directors must
not leave such decision to the shareholders without taking any position on the
matter. In the event that directors have to approve a transaction between the
company and a director, the directors must show that the transaction is fair to
both parties.10) If the directors are given the authority to decide whether to sell
the management control to a hostile company or to a white knight, the
directors’ role shifts from the protector of management control to a seller at an
auctioneer who must sell the company to the highest bidder to maximize
shareholders’ profit.11)
In defending the target company, the following two conditions must be
satisfied for the doctrine of business judgment to apply: (i) a reasonable belief
that there was a risk to the policy and efficacy of the company (i.e., the
“principle of reasonable basis”); and (ii) reasonableness of the defense
measures taken in relation to the degree of risk posed (i.e., the “principle of
proportionality”).12) Once the above two conditions are shown to be satisfied,
directors are protected under the doctrine of business judgment. 
To satisfy the principle of reasonable basis, the board of directors must
have in good faith decided, after examining the degree of threat, that it was
necessary to use the defense measures the board decided to employ. If the
Court recognizes that the use of the defense measures was appropriate, the
directors’ decision to use such measures will be deemed a valid business
judgment. To hold the directors responsible, shareholders must prove that the
directors violated their fiduciary duty by showing, among others, that (i) the
directors’ objective was to maintain their position in the company; (ii) the
directors did not act in good faith or committed fraud; and (iii) the directors
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lacked adequate information on which they could base their decision.13) Even
when the directors’ decision is not protected under the doctrine of business
judgment, it is sometimes justified under the principle of equity.14) In the event
the directors have to choose between two potential acquirers, the directors’
decision may be protected if it satisfies the principle of reasonable basis and
the principle of proportionality.15) When there is change of management, the
directors must in good faith take actions based on reasonably reliable
information, actively engage in negotiations with the potential acquirers, and
treat all potential acquirers on equal basis.16)
III. Repurchase and Sale of Company’s Own Shares for the
Defense of Management Control
1. Stock Repurchase for the Defense of Management Control
Prohibiting stock repurchase in principle, the Commercial Act permits a
company to buy back its own shares only for certain purposes such as the
cancellation of stocks (Commercial Act, Arts. 341, 341-2 and 342-2). On the
other hand, the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act
(“FSCMA”) permits stock repurchase if executed under certain circumstances
for the stabilization of management control or stock price (FSCMA, Art 165-
2(1)). A stock repurchase can serve as a particularly useful defense strategy
when the controlling shareholder lacks the capacity to protect her
management control, and it may be preferred by minor shareholders who
benefit from the resulting increase in the stock price.17)
The defense through stock repurchase may be summarized as follows: 1)
though treasury shares do not have voting rights, the voting rights can be
revived if the shares are sold to friendly third parties; 2) the repurchase of
stocks can raise the price of shares by decreasing their number in the market,
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and thereby increase the cost and risk for the acquiring company and reduce
its potential gains from the acquisition; 3) because a stock repurchase would
reduce the cash held by the target company, the target company will appear
less attractive if the aggressor company’s aim is to acquire the target
company’s liquid assets; 4) although the repurchase of shares would not
increase the number of voting rights held by the company due to limitations
on the number of voting rights that can be acquired through stock repurchase,
the proportion of the company’s voting rights will increase and thereby allow
the company to indirectly defend the management control and; 5) as other
kinds of defense strategies are more limited in their effectiveness, it is
relatively more advantageous to use stock repurchase for defense of
management control.18)
2. Discourse on Defense through Issuance of New Shares
Although the target company’s defense through the sale of treasury shares
is different from defense through the issuance of new shares, these two
defense strategies share structural similarities. A defense through issuance of
new shares may be regulated under Article 418(2) of the Commercial Act
which requires any issuance of new shares to have business purposes. Article
424 which allows shareholders to demand the company to stop any issuance
in violation of laws, regulations or its articles of incorporation or in an
obviously unfair manner by which shareholders may suffer disadvantages.
Citing the above provision of the Commercial Act, the Court has decided in
one case that even if the principle purpose of issuing new shares was to
defend the current management and there was no sufficient basis for the need
to quickly supply funds, the issuance of new shares may be interpreted as
having an business purpose under Article 418(2) of the Commercial Act if it
can be recognized that maintaining the current management and the
controlling shareholder would serve the interest of the company and ordinary
shareholder. In determining whether maintaining the current management
and the controlling shareholder serves the interest of the company and the
ordinary shareholder, the court took into consideration: (1) the purpose of the
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hostile takeover attempt and the source of the hostile company’s funds, (2)
operational strategies of the current management and the controlling
shareholder, (3) the corporate culture of the target company, (4) the social and
economic importance of the target company’s business, and (5) the prospect
on the continuation of the target company’s current business.19)
3. Sale of Treasury Shares 
The sale of treasury shares is distinguishable from the issue of new shares
in several different ways. First, unlike the issuance of new shares, which is
effected mainly to supply capital to the company, the sale of treasury shares,
which the company acquired with various objectives including the increase of
stock price, stability in management, payment of debt, and supply of security
interest, is not undertaken for the primary purpose of capital increase. Second,
while Article 418 of the Commercial Act regulates the preemptive right of new
shares, there is no provision in the Commercial Act regulating the purchase
right of treasury shares. Third, while the issuance of new shares increases the
number of total issued shares, the sale of treasury shares does not change the
number of total issued shares. Lastly, when new shares are issued to existing
shareholders, they do not change the ratio of shareholding, but when they are
issued to a third party, they may change the existing shareholders’ ratio of
shareholding. On the other hand, when treasury shares are sold to specific
shareholders or a third party, the existing shareholders’ ratio of shareholding
may be affected significantly as voting rights that have been suspended are
restored. Because of such characteristics of treasury shares, a target company
must take into account the particularities of the sale of treasury shares.
4. Case Precedents on Sale of Treasury Shares 
More recent cases involving the legality of the sale of treasury shares as a
defense against hostile takeover include the following: 1) the decision for
injunction against the exercise of the Seoul Western District Court on March
24, 2006 (2006kahap393); 2) the decision by the Seoul Western Court on June 29,
356 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 8: 349
19) 2003KaHap369 (Suwon District Court Yeoju Branch, Dec. 12, 2003).
2006, confirming that the over-the-counter sale of treasury shares was null and
void (2005gahap8262) (the “Daerim Tongsang Case”); and 3) the decision by the
Suwon District Court on January 30, 2007 (2007kahap30) (the “Fine-digital
Case”).
1) Cases Holding the Sale of Treasury Shares Illegal
The Court summarized the Daerim Tongsang case as follows: Neither the
Commercial Act nor Securities Act(before the enactment of FSCMA) apply
regulations for the issuance of new shares to the sale of treasury shares, and
the effect of sale of treasury shares is in principle different from that of the
issue of new shares because the former action changes neither the total asset of
the company nor the existing shareholders’ ratio of shareholding. However,
the sale of treasury shares can have the same effect as the issue of new shares
if the treasury shares are sold only to specific shareholders and the other
shareholders’ ratio of shareholding is consequently diminished. The sale of
treasury shares should, therefore, be regulated like the issue of new shares,
and the sale of treasury shares should be prohibited if it is used to avoid
regulations. In Daerim Tongsang, the sale of treasury shares had a significant
effect on the interest of the plaintiff who was a major shareholder and on the
control of the company. Taking into account the motive for the execution of
the share purchase agreement and the interests of the parties involved, this
Court hold the sale of treasury shares null and void.
This decision is significant in that the Court deviated from case precedents
by holding that the sale of treasury shares to specific shareholders violated the
rights of other existing shareholders and was thus invalid. The reasons for
holding the sale invalid was that: (1) the sale of treasury shares had significant
effect on the interest of the existing shareholders and on the control of the
company; (2) the other shareholders were not given the opportunity to buy
the treasury shares; (3) the treasury shares were sold only to specific
shareholders; and (4) taking into account the motive for the execution of the
share purchase agreement and the interests of the parties involved, the Court
could not overlook the sale. A target company’s defense tactics have been
supported with the logic that a stock repurchase would have a deterring effect
as it increases the cost of hostile takeover. Also, it is argued that if a hostile
takeover attempt is already being made, the sale of treasury shares to the
controlling shareholder or a friendly third party would increase the number of
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friendly shares and thereby help defend the management control. However,
with the above decision, it is possible that the sale of treasury shares to the
controlling shareholder or a friendly party during a hostile takeover attempt
will be held valid only if it was done in compliance with all applicable laws
and regulations. Therefore, to use defense measures involving the purchase
and sale of the target company’s own shares, it is necessary for the target
company to take greater caution to comply with all applicable laws and
regulations. 
2) Cases Holding the Sale of Treasury Shares Legal
In the case of Fine Digital, the sale of treasury shares was held legal. The
holding of Fine Digital is as follows: (1) selling treasury shares is
distinguishable from issuing new shares because the former neither affect the
company’s total assets nor the proportion the existing shareholders’ voting
rights; if these factors are considered, it is difficult to accept the claim for
cancellation of sale of treasury shares, which is similar to a claim for
cancellation of issuance of new shares; (2) because the sale of treasury shares
involves a third party, the sale can be found invalid only when the third party
knew or could have known that the purpose of the sale was to defend the
management control; (3) even in situations where the sale of treasury shares
can be made void due to the absence of resolution by the board of directors,
the sale of treasury shares can be found invalid only if the third party either
knew or could have known that the board resolution was never adopted.
The holding in this case outlined above is significant in two aspects. (1)
This case was decided on the premise that even if the treasury shares were
sold in order to defend the management control, because such sale essentially
is selling of shares that have already been issued, there is no effect on the
company’s total assets or on the proportion of existing shareholders’ voting
rights. Therefore, in this case, it is difficult to apply the reasoning for holding
the issuance of new shares invalid. This case is significant in that it decided
that the sale of treasury shares cannot be held invalid only because it was
undertaken for the purpose of defending the management control.20) (2) With
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regard to the legality of a sale of treasury shares that requires the board of
directors’ resolution, this case was decided on the basis that even if the sale of
treasury shares is deemed invalid due to procedural errors on the part of the
seller, the sale can be voided only when the other party in the dealing knew or
could have known that the seller did not have the board approval. This
holding seems to reflect the rule that the company does not assume liability
when the other party is unaware of the fact that there was no board resolution
when such resolution is required.21) However, it can be inferred from this case
that if the sale of treasury shares is for defending the management control and
if the directors acted out of malice for the benefit of a major shareholder or for
an illegal benefit of a director, thereby violating the public order and morals,
such sale of treasury shares can be voided.22)
5. Legality of the Sale of Treasury Shares to a Third Party
There is no standard prescribed in FSCMA, the Commercial Act or related
regulations for determining whether the sale of treasury shares to a third
party during a hostile takeover attempt is legal. Because of the lack of
standard, it appears that, in the past, such sale of treasury shares was deemed
either legal or subject to the business decision of the directors. More recently,
however, attempts are being made to apply Article 418 of the Commercial
Act, dealing with preemptive right of new shares, or Article 424 of the same
Act, dealing with issuance of new shares, to the sale of treasury shares
discussed above, and the Daerim Tongsang case was an example of such
attempts.
Unlike in Japan where regulations for the issuance of new shares are
applied to the sale of treasury shares, it appears that in Korea it would be
difficult to apply Articles 418 and 424 of the Commercial Act to a situation
where new shares are not being issued. This is because whereas an issuance of
new shares accompanies a capital increase, any increase from the sale of
treasury shares may be deemed as the return of capital of capital to its original
place. While the Commercial Act and FSCMA and the related regulations
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prescribe rules for the purchase of the company’s own shares, the two Laws
do not contain any provision on the sale of treasury shares, aside from some
procedural rules in FSCMA relating to regulatory reporting. As the sale of
treasury shares is considered a profit and loss transaction to which the
principle of shareholder equality does not apply, and as such sale is a personal
transaction between the transacting parties, any limitation on such transaction
should be carefully considered. Moreover, the application of regulations for
the issuance of new shares may result in diminished benefits of financial
management due to strict procedural requirements.23) Therefore, it would be
most reasonable to view the board of directors as having the authority to
decide on the sale of treasury shares, whether such transaction takes place on
exchange or over the counter, and whether the treasury shares are sold to
existing shareholders or to a third party. In principle, if the board of directors
decides to sell legitimately acquired treasury shares in compliance with
relevant laws and regulation, the resulting sale should be treated as legal. The
holding in Fine Digital discussed previously seems to be based on this
principle. Those who view the repurchase of the company’s own shares as a
legitimate defense against a hostile takeover attempt presuppose that the sale
of legitimately acquired treasury stocks to existing shareholders or a third
party is also a legitimate transaction. Even if treasury shares are sold to defend
the management from a hostile takeover attempt, it would be most
appropriate to determine the legality of such sale by examining whether the
defense was reasonable under the given circumstance.24)
If the board of directors has the authority to make a business decision on
the sale of treasury shares, then the legality of the decision should be
determined by applying the principle of business judgment, which is the
standard applied for evaluating board actions. In evaluating the legality of the
board decision, a determination on whether the treasury shares were initially
acquired by the company in compliance with relevant laws and regulations
would be an important step. Furthermore, the decision of the board can be
evaluated using the ‘principle of reasonable basis’ and the ‘principle of
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proportionality’ discussed above. The directors can be protected under the
principle of business judgment if there was reasonable basis for the belief that
the hostile takeover attempt posed a risk to the company policy and the
defensive measure taken was reasonable in relation to the degree of the threat
posed against the company. However, if the sale of treasury shares is only for
the interest of the controlling shareholder rather than for the interests of the
company and its shareholders who are faced with a hostile takeover attempt,
the decision of the board to sell treasury shares may be held illegal. 
The sale of treasury shares to specific major shareholders per se may not
violate the principle of shareholder equality. Nonetheless, it may be a
violation of the principle of equality as well as the directors’ duty of care as
fiduciaries if the company sells the treasury shares to specific shareholders for
a price that is significantly lower than the market price.25) Even under such
circumstance, the determination on the reasonableness of the sale should be
based on various factors including the reasonableness of the purchase price,
the source of the purchase money, the cause of contest over management
control, the long-term development plan of the company, how the hostile
party came to acquire shares, and the major shareholders’ long-term interests. 
Determining the reasonableness of the purchase price should not be
difficult if the shares of the company are listed on the Korea Stock Exchange or
KOSDAQ and a market price is established. However, if the company shares
are not listed and a market price is unavailable, determination of the
reasonableness of the purchase price may require complex procedures. The
‘market price’ of an unlisted share can be determined using the following
principles: (1) if there exists an objective exchange value that is established
through a transaction conducted in a normal and ordinary manner, that
objective exchange value should be the market price;26) (2) even if there is no
such other transaction, if the purchase price can be deemed objective because
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the purchase was conducted in a normal and ordinary manner, then the
purchase price may be treated as the market price;27) (3) if there exists no other
transaction and if the purchase price cannot be treated as the market price,
then the appraised value pursuant to the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act
shall be deemed the market price. If the company sells its shares at a price that
is substantially lower than the market price, the sale of the shares may be held
invalid, and the directors who approved the sale may be held liable both
criminally and for damages. If the directors are shown to have placed their
own interest ahead of the interest of the company, they may be held
responsible for breach of the duty of loyalty.
6. The White Knight Strategy and the Sale of Treasury Shares
The white knight strategy refers to a passive defense tactic in which the
target company finds a third party purchaser who would buy the company
under the condition that is more favorable to the current management of the
target company. There is also what is called the white squire strategy in which
the target company finds a third party purchaser who would buy only a
minority of shares without gaining management control and take a position
that is favorable to the current management. In Korea, the white squire
strategy is understood to be a type of white knight strategy.28)
It appears that the use of the white squire strategy can be quite helpful. In
addition to helping the company defend against a hostile takeover attempt,
the white squire strategy can improve the financial condition of the company
with the sale of treasury shares, and the funds acquired from the sale enables
the company to repurchase its own shares in the future. If the white squire
strategy is adopted, the legality of such strategy would be determined based
on whether the treasury shares were sold at a reasonable price to an
appropriate third party in a reasonable manner. 
While the white squire strategy can be used as a defense strategy against a
hostile takeover attempt that is already taking place, it may be more effective
362 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 8: 349
27) 86Nu408 (Supreme Ct., May 26, 1987); 92Nu1971 (Supreme Ct., Oct. 27, 1992);
93Nu22333 (Supreme Ct., Dec. 22, 1994); 2001Du5903 (Supreme Ct., May 27, 2003).
28) JAE-YEOL KWON, supra note 2, at 140.
as a preventive measure against a potential hostile attack. For example,
financial plans that involve the transfer of treasury shares, such the issuance of
exchangeable bonds and convertible bonds, may help prevent hostile takeover
attempts. However, because it is possible for a white squire to betray the
management and try to takeover the company, the company must use a
trustworthy party as the white squire, cause the white squire to enter into a
stand still agreement for mutual nonaggression,29) employ cross ownership of
shares to the extent the voting rights are not limited due to mutual
ownership,30) or employ a strategic cooperation arrangement that can hold
each other in check.
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29) When using the white squire strategy, the company offers additional shares to the white
squire with the condition that the white squire would enter into a stand still agreement
requiring the white squire to side with the current management in the face of hostile takeover
attempt. ARTHUR R. PINTO, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW, § 12.04.
30) In recent years, the Korean press has been reporting more frequently about the use of
cross ownership as a defense strategy against a hostile takeover attempt. For example, Maeil
)Business Newspaper published an editorial on July 4, 2007 that described the cross ownership
of shares between KT&G and Shinhan Holdings as a type of white knight strategy employed to
defend the management control. The editorial praised the cross ownership of shares as the best
defense strategy that is permitted by law. 
